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21. Introduction
Transition management (TM) approaches have generated considerable interest in
academic and policy circles in recent years (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005; Rotmans and
Kemp, 2003). In terms of a loose definition, a ‘transition can be defined as a gradual,
continuous process of structural change within a society or culture’ (Rotmans et al, 2001,
p.2). The development of TM, much of which has occurred within the context of the
Netherlands, may be seen as a response to the complexities, uncertainties and problems
which confront many western societies, in organising ‘sustainably’ various aspects of
energy, agricultural, water, transport and health systems of production and consumption.
Problems such as pollution, congestion, the vulnerability of energy or water supplies and
so on are seen as systemic and entwined or embedded in a series of social, economic,
political, cultural and technological relationships.
The systemic nature of many of these problems highlights the involvement - in the
functioning of a particular system and any subsequent transition - of multiple actors or
‘stakeholders’ across different local, national and international scales of activity. With this
in mind, such problems become difficult to ‘solve’ and ‘solutions’ are seen to require
systemic innovation rather than individual or episodic responses. The point being that
‘these problems are system inherent and… the solution lies in creating different systems or
transforming existing ones’ (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005, p.125).
In this paper we critically engage with and build upon transitions approaches to address
their ‘applicability’ in the context of the UK. In doing this the paper addresses the
prospective potential of transitions approaches, but also their relative neglect of places and
publics. Through developing an argument which addresses the strengths and ‘gaps’ of
transitions approaches we also analyse the resonances and dissonances between three
themes – cities and regions, public participation and national hydrogen strategy – in the
transitions literature and the UK policy context.
The paper is structured in five sections:
 Section 1 critically engages with transitions management by reviewing the key
concepts, claims and shortcomings of the approach.
3 Section 2 examines the omission of place in transitions approaches and begins a
process of addressing this ‘gap’ by developing a conceptual and empirical
understanding of cities and regions in transitions.
 Section 3 examines the relative neglect of publics in transitions approaches and
develops a framework for broadening participation in managing transitions.
 Section 4 takes the key themes from previous sections and analyses the ‘fit’ with
UK policy through the example of the development of A Strategic Framework for
Hydrogen Energy in the UK.
 Section 5 concludes by summarising key research and policy implications.
2. The Management of Transitions: the Importance of a Systemic Focus
2.1 Introduction
System innovation focuses on radical societal change and acknowledges a requirement, in
the ‘long-term’, for a multiplicity of forms of innovation. The interdependencies inherent
in systems may require innovation in terms of processes of production and consumption
and, as such, innovation in technologies, institutional configurations, new organisational
forms, new forms of knowledge and reflection on the (changing) role of government and
policy. System innovation does not preclude system improvement. This is important to
note as:
‘Transition management tries to utilize the opportunities for transformation that are
present in an existing system. It joins in with ongoing dynamics instead of forcing
changes. Transition management also implies refraining from large-scale
investment in improvement options that only fit into the existing system and
which, as a result, stimulate a “lock-in” situation’ (Rotmans and Kemp, 2003,
p.20).
The point here is that both radical societal change and unfolding change within existing
systems are ‘needed for sustainability’. Having said this and acknowledging in many ways
that ‘the goal of sustainable development has been accepted’ the background to the
development of transition management is predicated on ‘a paucity of concepts and tools to
work towards it’ (Rotmans and Kemp, 2003, p.6).
This becomes a particular issue in contexts of liberalised, privatised utility and
infrastructure provision, where the potential for numbers of vested interests and
4stakeholders is increased. This multiplicity and variety of stakeholders involved in a given
existing system is an important focus in understanding the transition from, but also
informs the shaping of transition to where the issues of how potential alternative system
transitions develop ‘are characterized by processes of variation and selection, by a variety
of new ideas and techniques of which many “die”, and only a few will “survive” and grow
out into large-scale developments’ (Rotmans and Kemp, 2003, p.14).
Leading proponents of TM suggest a general definition which acknowledges the long-
term, multi-stakeholder, iterative, processual and stepwise steering of transitions,
claiming:
‘Transitions are transformation processes in which society changes in a
fundamental way over a generation or more. Although the goals of a transition are
ultimately chosen by society, governments can use them to bring about structural
change in a stepwise manner. Their management involves sensitivity to existing
dynamics and regular adjustment of goals to overcome the conflict between long-
term ambition and short-term concerns’ (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.1).
The complexity and interconnectedness of different aspects of transitions are highlighted:
‘A transition can be described as a set of interconnected changes, which reinforce
each other but take place in different areas, such as technology, the economy,
institutions, ecology, culture, behaviour and belief systems. A successful transition
is a spiral that reinforces itself, driven by multiple causalities and co-evolution. A
pre-requisite for transitions to happen, is that several developments in different
domains at different scale-levels come together to reinforce each other’ (Rotmans
and Kemp, 2003, pp.9-10).
The rest of this section therefore focuses on the following issues: first, can transitions be
managed; second, how transitions are conceptualised; third what are the key transition
phases? And finally what are the key shortcomings of transitions approaches?
2.2 Can transitions be managed?
A question that arises from advocating or highlighting systemic transitions is: are such
transitions manageable? This, of course, depends on what we mean by ‘manageable’.
Given the acknowledgment of systemic problems, the uncertainty about how to ‘solve’
such problems and the timescales involved, tight management to achieve a specific goal is
not what underpins transitions management, rather the emphasis is on steering transitions.
5That is to say, transitions ‘cannot be managed in the classical manner of full control and
supervision, due to the fundamental uncertainties and many surprises on a transitional
pathway. However, transitions can be managed in terms of influencing and adjusting: a
more subtle, evolutionary way of steering’ (Rotmans and Kemp, 2003, p.15). Transitions
with an emphasis on sustainability thus focus on environmental, economic and social
aspects which are predicated on a ‘basic steering philosophy…of modulation, not
dictatorship or planning-and control’ (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005, p.132, original
emphasis). The ‘how’ of steering or modulation we will come to in the next section, but
we can highlight five key aspects and insights from TM (see Rotmans et al, 2001, p.8;
Kemp and Loorbach, 2005) that strategically underpin the steering approach:
The first of these situates short-term policy within the framework of longer-term thinking
and ambitions rather than specific goals. This acknowledges the incrementalism of
transitions but situates stepwise movements within a wider framework.
The second point highlights the multi-level or multiscale focus of transitions, the emphasis
on multiple domains and the multiplicity of different actors involved. An important
example of multiple domains can be seen in the area of different departmental policy
agendas. TM emphasises a focus on ‘connecting’ these domains but given its loose notion
of control, dialogue and unfolding learning offers the potential for the maintenance of
departmental agendas.
Thirdly, the focus on the two issues above places an emphasis on learning and processes
of learning-by-doing and doing-by-learning. It highlights that the role of policy in
systemic innovation requires ongoing iteration between ‘problems’, policy interventions,
existing systemic contexts and the possibilities of system innovation. A key facet of TM is
thus around ideas of anticipation, learning and adaptation. The fourth issue highlights the
importance, raised above, of a dual focus on system innovation and improvement. The
final point being that such an approach to confronting uncertainty keeps a large number of
options open.
This relationship between the short-term and the long-term means that transitions have
both content goals and process goals. In the short-term, policy actions and interventions
6become assessed in terms of immediate targets or in respect of their contribution to the
overall longer-term transition. A set of longer-term societal goals steer and are steered by
processes of anticipation, learning and adaptation, which are crucial to linking up short-
term measures to a long-term framework.
This highlights that the role of government must be seen in relation to this two-fold –
content and process – approach. In terms of content, there is a role for government in
‘realiz[ing] certain content objectives such as CO2 reduction…and to make sure that the
process of variation-selection is working well’ (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.12). The process
role is really about ‘creating the conditions’ within which transition processes can occur.
Having said this, the role of government will be different at different points or ‘stages’ of
the transition (we will return to the issue of stages). This is to acknowledge: ‘The role of
government in transition management is thus a plural one: facilitator-stimulator-controller-
director, depending on the stage of transition’ (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.11). This obviously
asks bigger questions about how transitions are conceptualised and occur.
2.3 How are transitions conceptualised?
In conceptualising transitions the ideas of levels and phases become important. Focusing
on levels, transitions approaches highlight a multi-level approach on three interconnected
levels, landscape, regime and niche, through which the aim is to address not only the
‘creation of technology, but also its diffusion and utilisation’ (Geels, 2004, p.898, original
emphasis).
The ‘nested’ levels (see Figure 1) of landscape, niche and regime ‘are not ontological
descriptions of reality, but analytical and heuristic concepts to understand the complex
dynamics of sociotechnical change’ (Geels, 2002a, p.1259). This being the case the
concept of landscape is important in seeking to understand the broader ‘conditions’,
‘environment’ and ‘pressures’ for transitions. The landscape operates at the macro level
and focuses on issues such as political cultures, economic growth, macro economic trends,
land use, utility infrastructures and so on (Geels, 2002b, p.369).
7Figure 1 Technological Transitions: landscape, regime and niche
Source: Geels 2002a
The concept of regime, which operates at the meso level, relates to existing or incumbent
technologies being intertwined within a configuration of institutions, practices, regulations
and so on, where configurations impose a logic, regularity and varying degrees of path
dependencies on technological change. Regime is defined as: ‘the whole complex of
scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process technologies, product
characteristics, skills and procedures, established user needs, regulatory requirements,
institutions and infrastructures’ (Hoogma et al, 2002, p.19).
The emphasis on regimes highlights the enablement and constraints on new technologies
breaking through whereby incremental evolutionary change may be more likely than
‘revolutionary’ change:
‘Such reconfiguration processes do not occur easily, because the elements in a
sociotechnical configuration are linked and aligned to each other. Radically new
technologies have a hard time to break through, because regulations, infrastructure,
user practices, maintenance networks are aligned to the existing technology’ (Geels,
2002a, p.1258).
8Regime we may see not only as interrelated in the nested hierarchy of levels but also
through patchworks of related regimes (Geels, 2002a, 2002b), including, for example,
science regimes, policy regimes, technological and product regimes, etc (Geels, 2004).
The idea of socio-technical niches, which operate at a micro level, is one of ‘“protected”
spaces in which actors learn in various ways about new technologies and their uses’
(Geels, 2002b, p.365), where innovation and processes of learning by trying keep alive
novel technological developments which otherwise may be ‘unsustainable’. The concept
of a niche provides a basis for addressing an appreciation of the circumstances within
which we might understand the development of radical innovations where initially
‘commercial viability might well be absent. [For example] The first applications of
electricity at world fairs, theatres and public events had symbolic value; they brought
excitement’ (Hoogma et al, 2002, p.25). This requires ‘special conditions created through
subsidies and an alignment between various actors’ (Geels, 2002b, p.367).
This necessitates a premise on highlighting the promise and expectations of hitherto
‘unproven’ technologies where to ‘get the new technology on the agenda, actors make
promises and raise expectations about new technologies’ (Geels, 2002b, p.367) where
these promises ‘are especially powerful if they are shared, credible (supported by facts and
tests), specific (with respect to technological, economic and social aspects), and coupled to
certain societal problems which the existing technology is generally not expected to be
able to solve’ (Geels, 2002b, p.367).
The constitution of networks and the expectations of a technology they present is
important in the creation of niches where a variety of possible radical innovations are
generated. In seeking to go about generating activities in support of these developments
niches may be seen as spaces for network development and learning (in some ways)
‘protected’ from the regime:
‘In the niche model, lock-in and path dependency assumptions are relaxed. Various
technological options can co-exist over a long period, precisely because of the
existence of niches requiring other functionalities…Niches may also persist
because actors such as firms and governments act strategically by keeping certain
options alive which might be important for future competition or other broader
societal goals’ (Hoogma et al, 2002, p.26).
9There is a difference in relative emphasis in TT approaches with some focusing more on
the regime in terms of transitions and incremental developments (Geels, 2002a), more so
than earlier work focusing on radical innovations by (Kemp, 1994). Technological
transitions are premised not on radical regime shifts but through ‘stepwise process of
reconfiguration’ (Geels, 2002a, p.1272).
Regime shifts may take place over a considerable period of time. Geels (2002a, p.1262)
points out that TT involves the linking of ‘multiple technologies’ and that the use and
development of innovations in different domains and contexts see a cumulation of niches
– an important mechanism in gradual regime shift. Early linkages between niche and
regime may rely on ‘link up with established technologies, often to solve particular
bottlenecks’ (Geels, 2002a, p.1271). There is an important focus on ideas of technological
add-on and hybridisation where existing and new technologies ‘form some sort of
symbiosis’ (Geels, 2002a, p.1271; see Raven, 2006).
The TT approach highlights the importance of the nested interrelationships of wider
landscape ‘environments’, the stability and interrelationships of regimes and the
innovative possibilities of niches. It outlines a way of thinking about the relationships,
resources and practices, including technologies, institutions, skills, etc, which sustain
existing configurations and regimes but also addresses processes of adapting and evolving
such a regime in relation to ‘pressures’ for, and contexts of, new technological
possibilities and innovations through processes of branching, add-on and hybridisation.
But how does this process unfold across time?
2.4 What are the key transitions phases?
Transition concepts operate at multiple-levels but also across phases, or stages, and thus
periods of time. We can distinguish four transitions phases (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.3).
These are:
1) ‘A predevelopment phase of dynamic equilibrium where the status quo does not
visibly change’. This places an emphasis, analytically on the regime and the
constraints that regimes place on future developments. The emphasis is on the regime
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maintaining the conditions which allow existing technologies ‘to work’ whilst seeking
to improve existing technologies as a means of confronting the potential of new
technologies.
2) ‘A take-off phase where the process of change gets under way because the state of the
system begins to shift’. ‘Take-off’ is informed by a ‘modulation’ of micro- and macro-
level factors, including niche levels innovations and macro-level worldviews. The
claim is that micro-level developments can inform macro-level views and vice versa
(Rotmans and Kemp, 2003, p.12).
3) ‘An acceleration phase where visible structural changes take place through an
accumulation of socio-cultural, economic, ecological and institutional changes that
react to each other’. In this respect there is a central focus on the regime, which
changes through processes of ‘self-examination’ in responses to pressures from niches
or landscape.
4) ‘A stabilization phase where the speed of social change decrease and a new dynamic
equilibrium is reached’. Following acceleration and a period of rapid change the
stabilisation phase sees a slowing down as a new regime has developed. Although
there is a degree of stabilisation, the equilibrium could potentially ‘accommodate the
seeds of change for another transition’ (Rotmans and Kemp, 2003, p.12).
In undertaking transitions, across different phases, Jan Rotmans and colleagues outline
five key steps to take (Rotmans et al, 2001, pp.8-10). These are:
The first step is the setting of a ‘transition objective’, which is not rigid but is more about
sketching the ambitions and aspirations of a multiplicity of actors (seen widely rather than
as narrowly technological) involved. The focus on the aspirational rather than on tight and
rigid objectives is an acknowledgement that the transition objective informs a process of
re-evaluation and adjustment over time.
The second step focuses on ‘transition visions’, where long-term visions inform the
formulation of short-term objectives and the evaluation of existing policy. The production
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of visions is an important ‘participatory’ process used to engage, inspire and mobilise
social actors. As part of a long-term process the transition visions and the goals
encapsulated in them are subject to evaluation and modification over time.
The third step is the production of ‘interim objectives’ as part of a process of the
reformulation of objectives over time. Through ‘backcasting’ from long-term objectives
the development of interim objectives then link shorter-term interim measures to long-
term objectives.
A fourth step focuses on actors’ in transitions ‘evaluating and learning’ around process
and content through ‘development rounds’, particularly in relation to set interim
objectives, where both transition processes and content are evaluated over time and the
lessons learned articulated through a series of questions (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.10). This
of course raises multiple crucial issues, including: the experiences of those involved in
such processes; it raises the issue of the dominance of certain actors in such processes, the
exclusion of others and also whether other forms of ‘participation’ could be usefully
drawn upon.
This relates to a (vague) final step -‘creating popular support’- where processes of
‘participatory decision-making helps to create support for policies’, through bottom-up
‘local experimentation with new technologies’, ‘education’ through ‘the prudent
introduction of new technology in suitable applications’ and drawing on ‘top-down’ and
‘bottom-up’ techniques to take ‘advantage of the heterogeneity of society, mobilising
support and problem-solving activities’ (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.10).
2.5 What are the key shortcomings of transitions approaches?
In a thoughtful contribution to this debate Frans Berkhout and colleagues (2003; Smith et
al, 2005), whilst acknowledging the strengths of transitions approaches and having a broad
sympathy with them, highlight seven issues:
First, by offering largely descriptive accounts, which focus on retrospective accounts of
socio-technical transitions, there becomes a degree of inevitability, or a teleological
understanding, ‘whereby tentative, mobile and elastic socio-technical configurations are
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seen to lead inexorably, through a cumulative sequence of stages, to lasting and
increasingly large-scale changes in a socio-technical regime. In practice, very few local
configurations developed in niches are successful in seeding regime transformation’
(Berkhout et al, 2003, p.7). With this in mind, Berkhout et al suggest the issue of why
some niches inform regime changes whilst others fail should be a focus of research
activity.
Second, Berkhout et al claim an over-privileging of the role of the niche in transition
activity pointing out that an overemphasis on the niche reduces and simplifies the
conditions of regime transition. This, then, leads, to another suggestion for further
research which focuses on the ‘underlying processes of regime change’ in a variety of
contexts (Berkhout et al, 2003, p.8). This relates to a set of ambiguities in transition
accounts in understandings of the relationship between the niche and regime where there
is a limited understanding of how niches could be ‘harnessed’ in ‘purposive’ transition
management.
Third, wider landscape pressures in terms of demographic changes or economic reform
can impinge directly on incumbent regimes. This, according to Berkhout et al, highlights
an important emphasis on macro-level processes, for example of government policy and
public opinion, influencing regimes rather than regimes influencing landscapes.
A fourth issue is a degree of ambiguity between transition concepts and empirical levels
and also with key transition concepts. The point here is that there are often inconsistencies
between the two issues with:
‘What looks like a regime shift at one level may be viewed merely as an
incremental change in inputs for a wider regime. Or alternatively, a regime shift at
a lower empirical level might be seen as a niche activity with regime transforming
potential within a higher-level regime’ (Berkhout et al, 2003, p.9).
Fifth, there are also problems with the idea of a vision. The suggestion being that there
‘appears to be no necessary correlation between the character of a particular guiding
vision and the scale of the ambitions that are actually realised’ (Berkhout et al, 2003,
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p.12). Furthermore, key questions of who becomes involved in the production of these
visions, whom they ‘represent’ and whose objectives are favoured are unclear.
Sixth, this question of who becomes involved also relates to the role of ‘the public’ in such
processes, where although we have a sense of configurations within niches, regimes and
between the two the transitions literature says little about engaging a variety of diverse
social actors (Berkhout et al, 2003).
Finally, this, then, relates to what is often seen as a shortcoming of transitions approaches
– the motivations, negotiations and unfolding aspects of actors in transitions – even
amongst key transitions authors (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.15). One can think back, here, to
the development of normative visions and the degree of problematisation that was often
lacking from transitions accounts in dealing with this issue and raises the possibility for
such processes to become a focus of research. The processes through which visions are
produced requires a focus on whose views inform such visions, and importantly who is
excluded, underpinned by what forms of expectations and aspirations as well as resources,
through what mechanisms or foras were they negotiated, with what forms of dissent and
compromise? But it also provides a way-in to thinking about a series of other issues about
not only who becomes involved, but from what context (regime or niche), and in terms of
spatiality at what scale, and at what point in a process and in what ways?
Following from this, Berkhout et al outline three particular aspects of transitions
approaches with which they make contention. The first of these is to question the view
that regime change begins in niches and works upwards and thus underplays the role of
landscape pressures on regimes. Second, they are univalent in that they underplay issues
of power and overplay consensus, intention and choice in the face of potentially multiple
social actors and expectations. The final point, that they are unidimensional, claims that
transition approaches often underplay differences in transition contexts and the balance
between historical contingency and human agency (Berkhout et al, 2003).
With this mind, Berkhout et al propose an emphasis on regime change which
acknowledges the multilineal, multivalent and multidimensional. In doing this they
highlight that addressing the context of the regime in transition processes opens up the
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possibilities for understanding a variety of transition pathways. Moving from an over-
privileging of the niche as the predominant pressure on the regime to also thinking about
the role of other regimes and the landscape in exerting pressures (the combination of top-
down and bottom-up pressures) on incumbent regimes raises questions about how
incumbent regimes transformations can be understood. Adaptive capacity refers to the
collective capacity of the regime to recognise, respond to and influence regime
transformation. In addressing the relationship between contexts of regime transformation
and transformation processes, Berkhout and colleagues highlight the importance of two
sets of issues:
 The extent to which regime transformation is intended or the outcome of historical
processes (in effect the balance of the relationship between structure and agency);
and
 The extent to which the pressures on the regime are responded to through
resources and relationships incumbent within the regime or co-opted from outside
the regime.
In mapping these two sets of issues along vertical and horizontal axis (see Figure 2),
Berkhout and colleagues are able to characterise four ‘ideal types’ of transition contexts as
a means of thinking about regime changes. The four are:
1) Endogenous renewal – is characterised by highly co-ordinated responses of incumbent
regime actors to perceived pressures on the regime, drawing upon endogenous or
incumbent regime resources. The consequences of endogenous actors and resources
informing regime change is that such change tends to be incremental;
2) Re-orientation of trajectories – Berkhout and colleagues point to regimes which
encounter radical re-orientation, either from inside or outside the regime, not through
the radical reconfiguring of regime relationships in anticipation of pressures on the
regime but through what they term a ‘shock’ or a radical shift through a ‘conjunction
of a series of uncoordinated technological opportunities, changes in market regulation
and obstacles facing alternatives’ (Berkhout et al, 2004, p. 69);
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3) Emergent transformations – appear to demonstrate an autonomous logic and occur
through uncoordinated pressures for change and responses external to the incumbent
regime; and
4) Purposive transitions – demonstrate a strong degree of intention in pursuing regime
transition but largely involving actors and resources from outside the regime.
Figure 2 Transition Contexts
Source: Berkhout et al, 2004, p.67
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2.6 Summary
The main benefit that the work of Berkhout and colleagues brings to transitions
approaches is to acknowledge that context matters. The key point being that pressures for
change within a system originate both within and outside a regime and the critical issue is
to understand how differing social interests adapt to such signals. Consequently: ‘there
emerges a clear need for greater acknowledgement and understanding of different
transition contexts’ (Berkhout et al, 2003, p.18, emphasis added). However, the transitions
literature says little about the ‘where’ of different contexts; it offers a limited sense of
place. It is this issue that we now turn our attention.
3. Transitions and Place: Understanding the Role of Cities and Regions
3.1 Introduction
Thinking about different transitions contexts opens up questions about the role of place in
transitions. Although we are sympathetic to technological transitions’ commitment to a
multi-level analysis and its insights into managed socio-technical change we have also
struggled to conceptually and empirically understand the role of cities and regions in
transitions. Are cities and regions simply convenient sites within which niches are
developed? Or do cities and regions actively seek to pull down and make relevant
landscape pressures in their distinctive local contexts? This then begs the questions of
whether cities and regions can establish their own regimes within which niches and
transitions are able to exist?
We can only find ways of addressing these questions by stepping outside the TT
framework to look at the implications from more critical approaches to technological
change that specifically address the urban and regional. The ‘re-emergence’ of the city and
region raises critical issues of how we think about the relations between place and
transitions.
While the multi-level approach is useful in understanding the distributed nature of
technological transitions our critical concern is that institutions, social interests and
knowledge are often assumed to be ‘out there’ (Geels 2004, p.902). Place is implicit
within the three fold division of landscape, regime and niche. Only within the niche is the
notion of place more explicit as some sort of bounded, experimental local context. We
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argue that TT would clearly benefit from an appreciation of ‘multi-level governance’ and
the politics of scale in understanding attempts to shape transitions in place. Key to this is
the development of a conceptual framework that permits us to analyse the entangled
relations and interactions of governance at different scales which inform potential
transitions. This is particularly significant in times of increased ‘globalisation’ and neo-
liberalism, where the changing role of the state and issues of multi-level governance raise
a whole series of issues not only about how we might think about the city and region but
also the interrelationships between regions, the local, national and supranational. How do
we understand cities and regions through multi-level governance in relation to place-based
shaping of technological transitions?
3.2 Competitive cities and regions and governance of innovation
Critical to understanding these shifts are changes in the international economy, through
the reconfiguration of national and international financial and political institutions (see
Aglietta, 1979) over the last three decades that have generated neo-liberal pressures for
increased ‘competitiveness’, ‘entrepreneurialism’ and ‘innovation’. This raises issues
related to both governance and technology, in particular the changing role of the nation-
state is important, where we are seeing a shift from the Welfare State to a Competitive
State (Jessop, 2002; 1994). The competitive state, has a ‘concern with technological
change, innovation and enterprise and its attempt to develop new techniques of
government and governance to these ends’ (Jessop, 2002, p.96, emphasis added).
Consequently new configurations of governance create and respond to increasing
international economic competitiveness through encouraging (particularly technological)
innovation at different scales. These structural shifts have three significant implications
for our understanding of cities and regions in technological transitions:
The first of these is to highlight the pervasiveness of notions of ‘competitiveness’ and the
ways in which this is manifest in wider ‘pressures for’ city and regional transformation
through science, technology and innovation. A closely aligned development in the UK
context has been the establishment of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), in 1999,
and many of their local and regional economic governance concerns around
competitiveness. This emphasis on narrowly defined features of economic governance has
also become a central concern of many local authorities (see Fuller et al, 2004). What
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often follows is an institutionalisation of ‘permanent innovation’ (Lovering, 1999),
predicated on the pervasiveness and ‘naturalisation’ in government and policy circles of
the virtues of particular forms of neo-liberal competition, a ‘race’ for competitiveness and
a constant search for transformation at the urban and regional scale. Cities and regions
develop positions on technological potentials to position themselves in the ‘global race’
for economic competitiveness.
This leads to a second point, that city and regional analyses need to take account of a
complex interplay of relationships at various political scales. Critically, this requires ‘an
appreciation of the complex geometry of power and the political and cultural struggles
through which societies assume their regional shape’ (MacLeod and Jones, 2001, p.670).
A focus on the ‘endogenous’ city and region and ‘creating the conditions’ for city and
regional socio-technical innovation often ignores what drives city and regional economies
and in doing so underplays the differential economic and political positions of places and
the wider role of the nation-state in devolving responsibility (but not power and resources)
for technology and innovation strategies to city and regional development (Ward and
Jonas, 2004). Cities and regions are differentially positioned within existing social,
political and economic relations that delimits their capacity to shape technological
transitions.
Finally, cities and regions are clearly constructed in an unfolding and structured set of
social, political and economic relationships. Importantly new technology and innovation is
both a product of, and produces political pressures for, institutional change. Seeing the
city and regional level as merely responding, as reactive, ignores specific relationships
informing a city and regional response but also ignores attempts to shape relationships
across space with a variety of, for example, national, supranational, and other city and
regional government departments and agencies. This highlights the importance of seeing
city and regional development in relation to technological transitions not only through the
lens of ‘endogenous’ institutional interrelationships, but also in terms of the influence of,
and relationships with the nation-state. Cities and regions actively and strategically work
both internally and externally in developing the resources, networks, and relationships to
actively shape technological transitions.
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There has, as we have highlighted, been much discussion of ‘entrepreneurial’ and
‘competitive’ cities and regions. By contrast there has been a relative neglect of issues of
environmental governance in the politics of scale and state restructuring literature
(Bulkeley, 2005). This begs questions about both environmental governance and how
issues of sustainability are addressed in the literature. This is particularly pertinent in view
of the increasing array of environmental commitments, developed in international forums,
which are ‘managed’ at sub-national levels, raising questions about how these
environmental aspects are incorporated into urban governance (While et al, 2004). The
claim is made (Bulkeley, 2005, p.889), despite some devolution downwards from the
national state of environmental responsibilities, that it is questionable whether the
rescaling of environmental governance can be understood ‘in terms of the same dynamic’
which underpinned the reconfigured relationships between state, economic governance
and a politics of scale. Yet, issues of urban sustainability have often been conceived of
locally in technocratic terms, thereby, ignoring contestations involved in producing
understandings of urban sustainable development across multiple scales (Evans et al,
2001; Bulkeley and Betshill, 2005). This is particularly important given the pre-
dominance of discourses of urban entrepreneurialism. The intuitive sense of the
relationship between economic and environmental governance is one of a paradox. Yet
there is an issue about how any tensions between the two are managed and understood and
questions about how we understand urban governance relationships in respect of economy
and environment.
One way of thinking about this as a ‘sustainability fix’ has been proposed, ‘which is
intended to capture some of the governance dilemmas, compromises and opportunities
created by the current era of state restructuring and ecological modernization’ (While et al,
2004, p.551). In this sense environmental issues are not seen as counter to issues of
growth but as a means ‘to safeguard growth trajectories’ through the ‘selective
incorporation of ecological goals in the greening of urban governance’ both as a means of
managing ecological dissent or pursuing new accumulation strategies (While et al, 2004,
pp.551 & 554). An urban sustainability fix focuses attention on these tensions and issues
in relation to a variety of cities.
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In this respect attributions to ‘sustainable development’ may not only be used to inform
the entrepreneurial and economic re-imagination of cities but also as an attempt to
‘neutralize environmental opposition’ (While et al, 2004, p.554). What this view of the
tensions and negotiations between economic and environmental aspects of urban
governance highlights is that ‘nature’ and the ‘urban’ are not divorced but ‘produced
through complex processes of “glocalization” and entangled in myriad flows of capital,
things and people’ (Keil, 2003, p.729).
In summary then, pressures for, and tensions between, economic, environmental and
technological changes and activity inform the re-articulation of places through a series of
relationships of institutions and individuals but these are predicated on (particular readings
of) history, and prior trajectories that rely on processes of adaptability and reflexivity. In
this respect cities and regions’ role in transitions is linked to their capability to adapt and
transform through reconfiguring and adjusting urban and regional institutions of
governance to technological transitions. The key question this raises is: what are the
implications of this analysis of the re-emergence of cities and regions for our
understanding of technological transitions?
3.3 Sensitising technological transitions to cities and regions
A ‘multi-level governance’ approach allows us to re-focus on three sets of issues that are
currently weakly conceptualised and understood within existing TT approaches (see for
instance the sympathetic critique by Berkhout et al, 2003).
First, there is the issue of the dominance of normative visions - a key step in transition
processes - and the degree of problematisation often lacking from transitions accounts. For
Berkhout et al this highlights the univalent nature of transitions approaches, especially the
overplaying of consensus and the underplaying of power relationships. The critical insight
from the ‘re-emergence of cities and regions’ is the prevalence of particular visions
perhaps most powerfully embodied in the notion of the race for technological progress and
economic competitiveness. This means that the processes through which visions are
produced requires a focus on whose views inform such visions, and importantly who is
excluded, underpinned by what forms of expectations and aspirations as well as resources,
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through what mechanisms were they negotiated, with what forms of dissent and
compromise?
This, second issue, then, relates to what is often seen as a key shortcoming of transitions
approaches – understanding the motivations, negotiations and unfolding relations of actors
in transitions. Even amongst key transitions authors (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.15) there is
recognition that:
‘Research must first be carried out into so-called systems of interaction. Attention
must be paid to the social and material context of interaction, and processes of co-
evolution’. (Rotmans et al, 2001, p.15).
Working through cities and regions allows us to look more critically at processes of
interaction across scales in a way which can acknowledge differential positioning, power
relations and varying capacities and potential for adapting local contexts. This brings the
suggestion that: ‘contemporary urban regions must be conceived as pre-eminently
“glocal” spaces in which multiple geographical scales intersect in potentially highly
conflictual ways’ (Brenner, 1999, p.438).
Finally, it also adds to our understanding of the role of government in ‘creating the
conditions’ for transitions. Although the nation-state is still important so also,
increasingly, are various other levels and scales of governance which are related often in
complex and different ways in various contexts. In particular: ‘in major urban regions
throughout the EU, regionally scaled regulatory institutions are being planned, promoted
and constructed as a means to secure place-specific locational advantages against’
(Brenner, 1999, p.440). We increasingly need to acknowledge the role of city and regional
scales in shaping technological transitions as part of a wider devolution of responsibility,
but not necessarily powers, to reshape the technological and economic competitiveness of
places.
In summary the reinsertion of cities and regions provides a way of conceptually
understanding three key insights from Berkhout and colleagues’ work, namely:
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1. The negotiated and potentially conflictual nature of visions of the future through
technological transitions;
2. The related limited understanding of processes of interactions in transitions; and
3. The role of government in ‘creating the conditions’ for transitions.
This relates to our starting point that the transitions approach says little about the role of
place. This, we suggest, should be rectified due to the ‘re-emergence’ of the city and
regional scale in purposively shaping technological transitions.
3.4 Mediating between cities/regions and technological transitions
With the increasing responsibilities devolved to cities and regions to shape technology and
innovation, specialist network intermediaries are being developed within places to shape
technological transitions. These intermediaries are usually cross-sectoral in composition,
network based (rather than bi-lateral), with a focus on a broad technological sector (rather
than a single technology) and can be characterised as transition managers within a
particular local context. There are two key sets of activities that characterise their work.
The first is the work involved in developing place-based images of technological
transitions. Intermediaries develop an understanding of existing city and regional contexts
(either from ‘within’ or ‘outside’ the city and region) and they position themselves
between technological possibilities and local contexts to re-think city and regional
contexts through technological transitions. In doing this, they identify (multiple) points of
intervention within existing and new systems of provision (between systems of production
and consumption). In the language of transitions they develop a ‘vision’ of a transition of
the city or region which takes (a particular) account and attribution of city or regional
history and outlines a vision of transition. In short, intermediaries attempt to manage the
(ongoing) production, transmission and reception of the vision of transition.
Visions are important media in mobilising and shaping expectations and commitment
around transitions and offer prospective views on the form, features, functions and benefits
of technologies in relation to domains of application. The purpose of visions and the goals
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they outline provide a focus through which networks can be built, gaining commitments to
participate, orientating the actions of potential participants and constituencies, and in
persuading potential participants of the desirability of transition (see Russell and
Williams, 2002, pp.60-1). Visions are not fixed and will change over time with the variety
of social interests who become involved.
The second role is in the governance of place-based transitions. Intermediaries build social
networks of actors who either position themselves favourably in relation to the debate or
whom are positioned by the intermediary. These actors can operate at various scales
(local, national, international scales) and may be public or private, governmental or non-
governmental. The potential involvement of multiple actors needs acknowledgement that
they are embedded in particular institutional settings with associated institutional
enablement and constraints, and views of the city or region, in pursuing their expectations
(i.e. they are not ‘free agents’).
This raises the possibility of a variety of expectations (see van Lente, 1993) of city and
regional technological transitions from multiple institutional positions and the ‘voices’
that dominate. In short, intermediaries ‘manage’ processes and governance of city and
regional transitions.
3.5 Summary
Our argument is that transitions take place in particular places and that places are
differentially positioned in terms of their ability to inform transitions. The concept of
systemic intermediaries allows us to address the extent to which particular places, here
cities and regions, strategically shape technological transitions. In doing this, we suggest
that understanding the early stages of transitions in particular cities and regions mean we
address the following:
1. Outlining the vision that has been developed for a particular place-based transition.
2. But also to understand the negotiations of these visions:
i. The social actors involved
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ii. The expectations from different positions embodied in them - this requires a
focus not only on ‘endogenous’ relationships within cities and regions but also
on the ‘exogenous’ relationships with national government, private capital etc.
The step between 1 and 2 allows us to look not only at the vision but also the extent of any
‘gap’ between the vision and issues of capacity in relation to the extent to which cities and
regions may shape (and be shaped by) transitions.
4. Shaping Transitions: Understanding and Broadening Participation in
Transitions
4.1 Introduction
Although we are sympathetic to transitions approaches and their illumination of the
possibilities for broadening ‘participation’ in ‘managing’ technological transitions, such
approaches not only say relatively little about the places in which transitions take place
and the role of different social interests in shaping the production of societal visions but
they also say little about the wider role of ‘publics’ in transitions,.
Our concern primarily is that given the transition approach addresses understanding (and
with shaping) systemic transitions in the socio-technical organisation of large scale
systems and infrastructures the approach has a relatively narrow conception of users that
focuses on the users of the approach and policy makers. The role of publics and wider
societal engagement is not systemically considered within an approach that would often
require ‘publics’’ involvement in transitions.
But if we are to move the debate forward we want to constructively engage with the role
of ‘publics’ in relation to issues of place and power relationships that we have previously
highlighted; via the development of an approach through which we can more productively
analyse social-technical innovation, publics, place and power. In this section we,
therefore, critically assess and positively contribute to wider debates around transitions by
developing a framework through which ‘public engagement’ in local contexts can be
connected to transitions debates. In doing this we address the interplay between ‘public
engagement’, technological development and the local context of its (non-)appropriation.
The context within which we address the role of ‘publics’ is one in which the dominant
discourse of ‘downstream’ ‘risks’ and ‘impacts’ in technology assessment, which has been
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dominant for many decades, is being challenged from a number of perspectives (see, for
e.g. Schot and Rip, 1997; Wynne, 2005).
4.2 Disconnections of transitions, ‘publics’, place and power
In developing an understanding of the role of ‘publics’ in transitions in place we first of all
consider the disconnections between publics, place and power in conventional transitions
approaches. As we have previously pointed out, transitions approaches (Geels, 2004;
2002; Elzen et al, 2004; Rotmans et al, 2001) have developed a multi-actor, multi-factor,
multi-level framework for exploring and interrogating socio-technical systems and in
understanding the possibilities and constraints on systemic transitions. A key feature of the
technological transitions literature is the development of a long-term vision which informs
the formulation of short-term objectives and underpins evaluation of existing policy. In
transitions approaches, the production of visions is an important participatory process used
to engage, inspire and mobilise social actors. As part of a long-term process transition,
visions and the goals encapsulated in them are subject to evaluation and modification over
time (Rotmans et al, 2001).
There are, however, difficulties with this particular conceptualisation of a vision (see
Berkhout et al, 2003). For instance there remain questions about ‘who’ becomes involved
in producing transitions’ approaches normative visions. The processes through which
visions are produced requires a focus on ‘whose’ views inform such visions, and
importantly ‘who’ is excluded, underpinned by what forms of expectations and aspirations
as well as resources, through what mechanisms or foras were they negotiated, with what
forms of dissent and compromise? This, then, relates to what is often seen as a
shortcoming of transitions approaches – the motivations, negotiations and unfolding
aspects of actors in transitions – even amongst key transitions authors (Rotmans et al,
2001, p.15).
Yet transitions approaches, however, do not explicitly say an awful lot about the role of
‘the public’. As transitions approaches are predicated on multi-actor, multi-factor and
multi-level aspects (Elzen et al, 2004) this is undoubtedly an important but challenging
issue to address. Often when this ‘gap’ is noted and flagged-up by transitions researchers
it is in terms of developing the transitions research agenda around understanding of the
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role of ‘users’ (Elzen et al, 2004) and moves to ‘explicitly incorporate the user side in the
analysis’ of technological change (Geels, 2004, p. 897). There has also been
acknowledgement of the desirability of a focus on aspects of ‘consumption and ways of
life’ (Elzen et al, 2004, p.283). A key figure in transitions approaches, Frank Geels (2004,
p.901), acknowledges that ‘[t]echno-scientific knowledge has become more distributed
over a widening range of actors (universities, laboratories, consultancies, R&D units in
firms)’, that ‘[c]ultural appropriation of technologies is part of consumption’ (Geels, 2004,
p.902), but that ‘in many studies, markets and users are simply assumed to be “out there”’
(Geels, 2004, p.902) and that it therefore necessary that we must pay more attention to
interactions between actors (Geels, 2002).
But when we start to think about interactions between actors, the existing notion of ‘users’
is far too narrow. Critical to an understanding of systemic innovation and the possibility
through transitions of fundamental shifts in the ways in which ‘publics’ conduct their
everyday life, are questions about who, when, how, on what terms and in what ways
‘publics’ become involved in transitions. Transitions approaches imply significant shifts in
the relationships between technology and society, and consequently the politics of how
technological change is managed (Schot and Rip, 1997), in the widest sense of that term.
When addressing the challenges and consequences faced by, for example, systemic change
in energy, water and mobility systems, Constructive Technology Assessment (CTA) an
approach closely linked to transitions approaches, offers some pointers as to how we
might think about the role of ‘publics (see Schot and Rip, 1997; Schot, 2001; Genus,
2006),’.
Rather than ‘assessing’ ‘black-boxed’ technologies in terms of their ‘impacts’, CTA
broadens out the assessment of technologies to focus on the design of technological
developments and the ‘participation’ of non-technical experts in shaping technological
development. This broadening of participants in technological development projects and
the aspirations for dialogue should be viewed in the context of wider debates in recent
decades around the ‘decline’ of trust in expert knowledge (e.g. Beck et al, 1994) and with
the deficiencies of what has been termed the ‘deficit model’ (Wynne, 1991) of the process
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of one-way expert-public science and technology communication predicated on notions of
an ignorant public.
The move CTA makes is to bring technology developers together with ‘interested parties’
of policymakers, users and citizens to become involved in the design process. By contrast
to traditional technology assessment approaches, which focus on the ‘impact’ of
technologies, there is an important role for human agency across a range of interested
parties. In particular there is an emphasis on the anticipations of the future consequences
of technologies with the assumption that this encapsulates the values and interests of
social actors from various different perspectives. These anticipations may be subject to
change as part of an unfolding process and, thus, the reflexivity of various social actors
becomes an important facet of CTA approaches, as does the interactions between social
actors which underpin this and consequent social learning. Processually, there is an
ongoing modulation of demand and supply issues through the interests of different social
actors. In this respect there is not just an important contribution in terms of initial phases
of design but also through demonstration projects and ongoing processes of social
learning.
With a focus on an unfolding assessment of technologies through dialogue and interaction,
CTA draws on various methods which are not specific to CTA, including: consensus
conferences, scenario workshops, electronic consultation, public inquiries and citizens
juries (Genus, 2006, p.14). In short:
‘A basic tenet of CTA is that the design of technological development should be a
broader, interactive process including a variety of societal actors in addition to
technical experts. The effect of broadening the design process is that the
designers’, users’, citizens’ and policymakers’ ideas and values are articulated
quite early, and are negotiated and renegotiated throughout the course of the
technology development process (which is itself a process of constant design and
redesign). This will counteract the prevalent tendency to organize technology
development in a basically linear fashion (from development, to market
introduction, to regulation) and will allow for more continuous evaluation and
modification of new technologies in the making’ (Schot, 2001, p.41).
CTA undoubtedly has aspirations to move on from what Johan Schot suggests is the ‘the
current patter of technology management…[which] is to sponsor development and
regulate application’ (Schot, 2001, p.40). There are also significant potential benefits of
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debate, dialogue and the development of more ‘socially robust’ knowledge prior to the
development of physical infrastructures and their associated sunk costs.
CTA does offer some significant and important insights that could begin to re-populate
transitions approaches with its missing publics. But there are also four issues raised by
CTA researchers that mean we cannot simply and uncritically import this approach into
transitions approaches. First whilst CTA broadens out the possibilities to ‘participate’ in
technology design this usually takes place after the decision to develop a technology has
been made and, as such, focuses on the design of technology rather than issues of purpose
prior to the business decision. Second, this begins to make visible hidden aspects of power
relationships and structural concerns including issues of ‘access’ and resources (Genus
and Coles, 2005) and, in particular, asks questions about who frames what, in CTA terms,
is a focus on technology development? Third, if there needs to be a focus on who frames
an issue there are also necessary concerns about what their expectations are and for what
purpose is an issue framed in a particular way. Finally, there is importance in analysing
the methods and processes via which these expectations are translated into action and
through which attempts are made to engage others in negotiating and renegotiating
expectations in processes of ‘engagement’ and ‘participation’.
Consequently we argue that if we are to develop an approach to transitions that takes
publics seriously then it is critical that we address the following four issues:
 The role of publics in framing visions of the future through technologically-
informed change before they are closed.
 The issue of who frames visions of the future and with what expectations?
 The ‘engagement’ or ‘participation’ processes and methods in negotiating and
renegotiating the future.
 The analysis of the relationship between vision and actuality and the lessons
we can draw from this.
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4.3 Developing a conceptual framework for analysing publics and transitions
These four issues are now addressed by developing a framework for analysing the role of
‘publics’ in framing and translating into action technologically-informed visions of the
future.
Framing a vision of the future
CTA highlights the critical importance of human agency, contingency and the possibilities
of socially shaping technologies (Williams and Edge, 2000 [1996]; Mackenzie and
Wajcman, 1999). But by focusing on the design of technologies after the business or
policy decision has been taken to develop them, CTA then frames (see Goffman, 1974)
technology development as ‘designing in action’ rather than addressing issues of the
purpose of technological development (Wynne, 2005). Our argument is that in view of the
challenges to the legitimacy of expert knowledge and the increasingly porous boundaries
of scientific and technological knowledge production, the aspirations of CTA, whilst
laudable aspirations, do not go far enough. Or to be more specific, they do not go far
enough ‘upstream’ (see Wilsdon and Willis, 2004).
CTA in questioning the focus of technology assessment on ‘impacts’ does seemingly
move some way upstream yet, through neglecting issues of purpose, still ultimately takes a
focus on assessing impacts of technologies (see Wynne, 2005). Brian Wynne has pointed
out that in terms of what is frequently claimed to be upstream engagement ‘this radical
apparent potential is compromised by deeper, less manifest cultural assumptions and
commitments framing most such initiatives, and that these problematic foundations have
yet to be identified, confronted and changed’ (Wynne, 2005, pp.66-67). The key point for
us here, if we think about Wynne’s argument which he makes in the context of the
upsurge in contemporary ‘participatory’ initiatives, is in terms of the ways in which CTA
encourages dialogue after the business or policy decision has been made, which crucially:
‘reflects an assumption that the public meanings, or issue definitions, are naturally
and properly the sovereign domain of authoritative expert institutions, and that
citizens have no capability or proper role in autonomously creating and negotiating
such collective, and potentially more diverse, public meanings’ (Wynne, 2005,
p.67).
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If one thinks back to the guiding normative visions fundamental to the iterative process of
steering transitions, this then suggests that diverse public meanings may be framed-out or
closed-down at the earliest ‘upstream’ stages of the production of visions (Stirling, 2005).
This is important as visions are important media in mobilising and shaping expectations
and commitment around transitions (see Russell and Williams, 2002, p.60).
Visions have been used in the Science and Technology Studies literature to offer
prospective views on the form, features, functions and benefits of technologies in relation
to domains of application. In this sense, visions articulated at an early stage of
development can be viewed as highly aspirational and be seen largely in terms of their
symbolic representational articulation of a future rather than a material one (although this
is not to neglect the material production and media of communication of the vision). In
this respect visions are ‘culturally anchored’ (Borup et al, 2006) and offer particular
characterisations of the future from the present, often invoking particular attributions of
the past. The purpose of these visions and the goals they outline provide a focus through
which networks can be built, gaining commitments to ‘participate’, orientating the actions
of potential participants and constituencies, and in persuading potential participants of the
desirability of transition (see Russell and Williams, 2002, pp.60-1). Although visions are
not fixed and will change over time with the variety of social interests who become
involved, the key point is that there is an issue of whether visions are initially articulated
around narrow self-interests rather than in terms of a broader sense of societal purpose.
Making-up a vision of the future
The issue this raises is who, or which social interests became involved in producing this
vision, with what expectations and with what views of particular ‘publics’? The literature
in the sociology of expectations (see Borup et al, 2006) offers a fruitful focus here,
although we are necessarily selective in drawing on this emerging literature. In the early
stages of framing and producing a vision of the future in relation to technological change –
given the importance of visions in the subsequent mobilisation and shaping of
expectations – the issue becomes one of articulating the variety (or otherwise) of
expectations which inform the early stage production of a vision and importantly the ways
in which these are communicated.
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In focusing on the social construction of visions, through the variety of expectations which
inform this, we also acknowledge the differential capabilities and positioning of social
interests to meaningfully engage in this process of framing the future. The degree of
contestation and the breadth of expectations involved in producing a vision may be
narrowly or broadly framed. The importance of whose expectations inform the early
stages of a vision are that expectations are ‘constitutive’, particularly at the early stages of
innovation, in defining roles, attracting interest and building mutually binding obligations
(Borup et al, 2006). Additionally, and importantly in view of the spatial shortcomings of
transitions approaches, there may also be a significant socio-spatial variability of
expectations (Borup et al, 2006), from and of particular places.
Captured within these expectations, either implicitly or explicitly, are views of the
relationship between those producing the vision of the future and ‘publics’. This
relationship can be seen in a number of ways, but it is useful here to highlight views of
‘publics’ and ‘participation’ in terms of Andy Stirling’s conceptualisation of forms of
‘participation’ in the social appraisal of technology as normative, instrumental and
substantive (2005, pp.220-222).
The first of these, the ‘normative’ approach, is underpinned by a sense of the democratic
empowerment of citizens participating in decision-making around technological decision-
making as ‘the right thing to do’ and ‘an end in itself’.
Second, the ‘instrumental’ approach can be seen as ‘a better way to achieve particular
ends’ from the strategic viewpoint of incumbent interests, through, for example, the
extraction of strategic intelligence from ‘participatory’ relationships which may also be
used in the presentation particular, already determined, decisions.
Finally, the ‘substantive’ view focuses on issues of the ‘social robustness’ of particular
technological developments and possibilities in respect of the diverse potential array social
knowledges, values and meanings and the ways in which appraisal is sensitive to
differences in this respect and thus produces ‘authenticity, robustness and quality in
choices that actually result from appraisal’ (Stirling, 2005, p.222).
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(Re-)negotiating and materialising a vision through ‘participation’ and ‘engagement’
processes
Rather than a neutralised or depoliticised view of processes of ‘participation’ and
‘engagement’, the expectations of particular social interests and the ways in which they
are embodied in a vision of the future frames unfolding processes of the negotiation and
renegotiation of the future. What is crucial to this is not only the symbolic construction of
the vision and the expectations underpinning the vision but how these aspirations inform
and translate materially.
Important here are the formal and informal processes of ‘participation’ and the methods
mobilised. The types of methods that are mobilised, the questions asked, by whom, the
timing of their mobilisation in terms of a socio-technical transition and the alignment of
social interests and the concomitant resources they can draw upon highlights the
politicised extent of ‘participatory’ methods which are often viewed as de-politicised and
neutral. It also highlights, in terms of Andy Stirling’s three-fold classification, possibilities
to ‘open-up’ or ‘close-down’ (Stirling, 2005) processes of socio-technical innovation. In
addition, with the upsurge of new ‘participatory’ methods, alongside the plethora of
existing techniques and mechanisms, evaluating the role of participatory (engagement)
methods becomes extremely confusing. Indeed what may or may not constitute
participation has a long history (see Arnstein, 1969), with key concepts not particularly
well-defined even taking into account the fruits of this long history (Rowe and Frewer,
2005). With this background in mind, views of what might constitute ‘effective’ public
participation are not only unclear (Rowe and Frewer, 2004), but require a sensitivity but
not a capitulation to the local context within which they are mobilised.
Consequences: from vision to actuality?
The issue, when moving from a vision and its production, through unfolding forms of
participation in trying to translate a vision into action, and the issues that are raised by
such processes and the extent to which the vision resonates with actuality or otherwise.
4.4 Implications of the Framework
This section has developed and demonstrated a framework for analysing the interplay
between ‘public engagement’, technological development and the local context of its
(non-)appropriation. We have developed a framework that attempts to re-connect
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transition approaches to the role of publics, the specificity of places and competing visions
of socio-technical change. By sensitising transitions approaches to these issues we have
attempted to develop transition perspectives in the following four ways.
First, we have highlighted the critical role and importance of symbolic and often highly
partial visions of the future, in the present, through the development of technological
change. Critically we need to understand how such visions are constructed, the degree of
inclusivity, the assumptions that underpin their conception of socio-technical systems and
the model of social change that is implied by that vision.
Second, we have demonstrated the potential variability and particularity of those social
interests whose expectations inform a particular view of the future. Critically we need to
understand who is involved in developing visions of technological transitions. Which
social interests are involved in the construction of visions, who is excluded – either
implicitly or explicitly - from the development of visions, and how socially robust and or
inclusive are such visions as a consequences of the contingency and selectivity of their
production.
Third, we have illustrated the potential consequences of these differences in the ways in
which particular social interests, and their domination of power relationships, informs the
negotiation and renegotiation of a vision of the future in its translation to practice.
Critically this involves carefully tracing the unfolding of visions and expectations as they
interact with unanticipated social interests that challenge or question the validity or social
robustness of a vision.
Finally we highlighted that key lessons can be learned from processes of moving from
Vision to Actuality.
4.5 Summary
The key issue, and focus for future research, thus becomes developing a better
understanding of the interplay of vision, expectations, processes and methods in specific
contexts. This call is not to be totally reducible or to capitulate to context but to develop
sensitivity to context. In doing this, development of cases in particular contexts are not an
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end in themselves but should be used to inform comparison of patterns, trends and
regularities. Through such a programme of work the transitions approach could begin to,
more carefully and systemically, become sensitised and transformed to a wider politics of
publics, place and expectations that recognises and works within differential and
asymmetries of power.
5. Comparing UK Policy with Transitions Management: The Case of
Hydrogen
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to provide a short review of the UK national approach to
hydrogen economy developments and to assess the resonances and dissonances with a
technological transitions approach. The focus being: how does the transitions management
literature match against current policy processes in the UK? We use a transitions approach
as a way of trying to illuminate and understand how the development of a shift, move and
evolution to a hydrogen economy is seen in Whitehall. We are not therefore arguing that
the UK currently does or should use a transitions approach – rather we are trying to
understand what sort of approach it does adopt when contrasted with a transitions
management perspective
The key message of transitions approaches is that long-term systemic change can be
shaped or managed. Transitions approaches, and critical engagements with these
approaches, also highlight the complexity of relationships, scales and issues which figure
in attempts to manage transitions. We use these insights to aid understanding of policy
processes in the development of a national UK Strategic Framework for Hydrogen
Energy. We characterise this through addressing three aspects of the process:
1) The rationale for creating a Framework;
2) The production of the Framework; and;
3) Responses to the Framework.
In addressing these issues, we undertook 10 interviews with policy and consultancy
officials who had a ‘close involvement’ in the production of the Strategic Framework and
we also analysed the Strategic Framework (E4Tech et al, 2004) and key policy documents.
35
5.2 Rationale for the Framework – ‘The threat of the race’
Prior to the Framework, the policy context was dominated by a concern with ‘not picking
winners’ as the government ‘doesn’t like to make big bets and doesn’t have anything like
the sort of funding that several other leading nations do in fuel cells and hydrogen’. Yet at
the same time there was concern about the UK’s absence from the ‘international race for
hydrogen’ given the emergence of European, US and Japanese initiatives around the
hydrogen economy. There was a degree of recognition that ‘falling behind’ in the ‘race’
‘required’ action by government:
‘at the time of kick off [of developing the Framework]…from a government
perspective…they where very much exercised by the fact [other] governments
seemed to be spending a lot more and doing a lot more and making a lot more
noise, and I think that’s probably…the single biggest thing that was exercising that
[interest in the hydrogen economy]’.
At the ‘kick-off’ stage there was some potential recognition that transformation and the
shift to a hydrogen future was potentially systemic. Underpinning this potentially systemic
shift was an interest in the potential that hydrogen may offer as a replacement (or a
hybrid) for the carbon economy. Yet this met with a recognition that in scoping out such a
strategy the capacity and/or expertise to do this did not currently exist within Whitehall as
one official stated: ‘I think the problem is that it’s still pockets of activity at the moment’.
The limitations of capacity and expertise need to be viewed in addition to the cultural
contexts encountered by many policy officials where ‘thinking time’ was restricted. As
one official argued: ‘we simply don’t have the time to always have a coherent approach –
what I am saying is there’s not necessarily a lot of thinking time in developing grand
policy strategies’.
The public policy role in managing transitions, in a context of ‘not picking winners’ and
limited Whitehall capacity and expertise, underscored a UK view that:
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‘whilst public policy has a role we are currently really a catalyst society at the
moment and the view is that we are helping early demonstrators to show that
technology can be commercially viable’.
With these constraints – ‘not picking winners’; disconnected governmental activities;
restrictive capacity and expertise; limited ‘thinking time’; and the view of the role of
policy in the ‘catalyst society’ - as a context, the production of the Strategic Framework
was outsourced.
5.3 Producing the Framework – ‘Outsourcing Hydrogen Strategy - UK energy
priorities’
E4tech, Element Energy and Eoin Lees Energy, were commissioned, initially in autumn
2003, by DTI – which leads on hydrogen and fuel cells policy at central government level
– to produce the Framework. Following the outsourcing of the work the consultants ‘came
inside’ Whitehall and attempted to support various departments in working up a strategy
which, given the limitations of resource, they would have been struggling to achieve. This
included working within and across government departments - including Department for
Transport, the Treasury, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office and others - to develop an understanding of the contribution of
hydrogen to UK energy priorities
The central question was, why is hydrogen interesting to the UK? The work was primarily
framed in relation to the national energy debate and around related aspects of CO2
emissions reduction and national energy security. Within this context, there was a strong
focus on identifying the applications that in the conceivable future would be able to
contribute strongly to CO2 emissions reductions and national security of supply. The
process from the consultants’ perspective was ‘driven from a national policy objective
firstly because this is in effect a national intervention strategy’.
This emphasis was underpinned by a series of interviews and meetings with national
officials across government departments and in ‘trying to take government on the journey
with us. We had a steering group that included [national officials]’. The focus was on
engaging national policy officials ‘because we didn’t see this, at this stage, as being a
“what does the industry need at this stage”…The needs of the industry are extremely
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relevant but at this stage we were to think…how does the UK engage in hydrogen
economic activity with the maximum benefit?’
A linear model of innovation with some other ‘inputs’ along the ‘innovation chain’ (see
figure 3) informed the development of the strategy where there was a strong sense of
‘pulling the technology through’, but given the context of the ‘huge failure’ of national
leadership the Framework was designed to create a context rather than ‘pick winners’. The
language of linear innovation remained prevalent in discussions we had with national
officials, who were often searching for ‘mechanisms to help pull them [technologies]
through towards deployment’. At the same time there was recognition that the linear
model of innovation was discredited:
‘And we certainly would try not to inculcate in the DTI, [in] government’s mind
that there is an innovation chain and you feed it in one end and commercialised
products would come out the other. This is just visually convenient to do’.
Figure 3 Representing Linear Innovation
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Five main areas of support are needed to develop hydrogen
options for the UK
Support for
commercialisation
Support for R&D Support for
demonstration
Co-ordination of UK hydrogen activities
Creation of demand conditions for hydrogen
Source: E4Tech et al, 2004
The Framework’s recommendations focused on five issues:
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The development of six hydrogen transport chains (see figure 4).
A co-ordination body – a Hydrogen Coordination Unit (HCU) - was needed for UK
hydrogen energy activities.
A UK hydrogen energy industry association was required to represent the commercial
interests of the sector.
Government action was needed to support hydrogen R&D, demonstration,
commercialisation, and demand stimulation.
R&D and demonstration activities needed to be coordinated by the HCU.
Figure 4 Six Hydrogen Chains
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The six options require 17 areas to be addressed, 13 of which
are unique to hydrogen
1. Fuel cell road vehicles incl. storage
2. Other hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles
3. Hydrogen pipelines
4. Road transport of hydrogen
5. Refuelling infrastructure
Biomass and waste supply
6. Biomass gasification to hydrogen
7. Hydrogen integration in biomass systems
Nuclear electricity
Renewable electricity
8. Hydrogen integration with renewable energy
9. Electrolysers
10. Novel hydrogen production technologies
11. Natural gas reforming
12. Hydrogen integration in natural gas systems
13. Coal gasification to hydrogen
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)
Areas to be addressed
Biomass gasification
Renewable electricity
Nuclear electricity
Novel H 2 technologies
Natural gas with CCS
Coal with CCS
Hydrogen chains
Common to all
chains
Common to 2 chains
Common to 2 chains
Source: E4Tech et al, 2004
39
5.4 Responses to the Framework and next steps – ‘more demonstrations rather than
strategy’
It became apparent that the government’s response was unlikely to match the hopes and
expectations embodied in the Strategic Framework. Recognising this, in the stage just
before the publication of the report there was both a public and private set of
recommendations. What became apparent was that government was only going to provide
limited resource and that this would be focused on more demonstration projects of which
hydrogen could be a part.
First, there was a tension in action, between the transition frequently talked about to a low-
carbon economy, the issue of setting carbon targets but not ‘picking winners’ and
maintaining a ‘technology neutrality’. In short the response constituted, a ‘light touch’,
‘market measures’ approach to transition. However, in this policy context of ‘not picking
winners’ the Framework was technology-specific (even though it could also be seen as
generic – for example as a suite of hydrogen technologies). Within this context, therefore,
hydrogen was but one option. When national officials were asked about how a hydrogen
economy would materialise if there was a ‘light touch’ national approach, there was a
frequent recognition of the need for a strong political leadership and that this leadership
was in the regions (London was mentioned frequently as a key exemplar) and not in
Whitehall!
Second, the response of more demonstrations, however, remained largely lacking in
strategic underpinnings, where: ‘there is concern that we fund niche projects that are going
to remain niche projects’. Where one view in particular was that: ‘hydrogen will happen in
the areas where there is strong political leadership’. But where there is
‘a great deal of blurred thinking about demonstrations… because I think people
mix up technology-proving demonstrations…and market-awareness and
stimulation type demonstration which is a totally different thing’. With the
consequence that ‘you need to be very, very clear about your objectives for
demonstration’.
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Third, the co-ordinating role of the HCU offered the potential for addressing some of these
issues and interrelationships strategically in relation to the six transport chains. Yet,
despite the acknowledgement of the desirability of a HCU in the government’s response
there has been little progress in this respect.
Fourth, developing the six hydrogen transport chains (ironically in view of the focus on
national security of energy) with the lack of a large British automotive manufacturer
meant that ‘partnerships’ were needed with international car manufacturers. This
highlights the centrality to policy of attracting foreign direct investment, but also that there
was a sense from the officials we talked with that given this there was an ‘outward facing’
position where the issue of sub-national politics and agency was relatively underplayed. In
discussions we had with officials, it was clear that there were few if any attempts to link
the different parts of DTI, here the Automotive Unit to those other parts of DTI
developing demonstrations. Overall, there was a sense of numerous sorts of
disconnections, predicated on different aspirations from departmental positions and
consequently limited ‘join-up’.
Fifth, there was a strong sense from talking to policy officials that it was not for central
government to provide leadership (‘we only do the targets’). The consequence of this was
that when officials talked about the development of a hydrogen economy they frequently
referred to the role of London in hydrogen, through not only the CUTE fuel cell bus
demonstrations in London but also via frequent reference to Ken Livingstone. This was
part of a trend which emerged strongly in the interviews, where every time discussions
took on a systemic transitions focus national officials distanced themselves from a role in
‘delivering’ this.
Sixth, not only was there frequent recourse to London but also to an intermediary
organisation, Cenex. Cenex was the UK’s Centre of Excellence for low carbon and fuel
cell technologies. Its roles were numerous but importantly looked ‘outwards’: ‘to actually
showcase this UK expertise on an international stage’. This ‘outward facing’ focus was
underpinned by Cenex’s role in
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‘pulling together hitherto disparate actors and activities [where] we are not talking
about traditional automotive suppliers. So we are looking at a whole new
community and…they would be new entrants, there would be a lot of university
spinouts. So we have got to try and engage these people, but we’ve also got to
engage the industrial gas people, the energy sector and it involves a sort of cross-
sector working which is always difficult’.
Cenex’s role was in trying to facilitate and build these ‘new’ supply chain relationships.
The development of supply chains was seen as a means of attracting foreign direct
investment in low carbon technologies, including hydrogen and fuel cells. There was an
outward-facing ‘showcase’ function here but in doing this the supply chains would
‘somehow, join up some of the regional activity…and then use Cenex to forge the
relationships with the global automotive industry’.
Finally, a well understood and widely shared ‘vision’ of the transition to a future hydrogen
economy was largely missing. The ‘vision’ was differentiated by departments but can be
characterised by the differential role of various government departments in a linear model
of innovation. Different government departments took a particular responsibility around
research (OSI), between development and demonstration (DfT; DTI). The space between
demonstration and deployment was largely abdicated by government and public subsidy
and the leap required for a technology between demonstration and deployment was across
what numerous national officials characterised as ‘the Valley of Death’:
‘where the “Valley of Death” really occurs between the demonstration phase and
the deployment phase because that’s when the public subsidy tends to run out and
we are expecting these things to go commercial’
5.5 Issues
Thinking about the multi-issue, multi-actor and multi-level approach to systemic
transitions reveals a stark contrast with the linear, departmentalised and largely
unsystemic government response to the Strategic Framework. Crucially:
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1) There was little sense of a shared vision instead there was a centrally developed set
of targets as a prelude to market delivery.
2) There was little sense of configuring social interests (or even other elements of
Whitehall). The result was very little connection between those elements of
government that could link a (discredited) linear model of innovation.
3) There was limited capacity centrally to develop a transition. With this as context,
there was a strong sense of out-sourcing strategy to consultants and
implementation to intermediaries, with central government focusing on
demonstrations and funding schemes rather than purposive shaping.
4) There was a strong sense in the interviews of absences in systemic transitions and
those being filled by others (consultants, other departments, cities and regions,
intermediaries), and consequently an understanding that policy was not systemic or
transition-based.
5) The transitions literature highlights the importance of this type of steering role and
this is what is required. In the context of national government there was a
‘distancing’, an expectation that ‘others’ would provide that coordination and
work.
5.6 Summary
In terms of the UK national policy context, it is important to understand the following
three styles of thinking within which the development of the Framework was strongly
shaped which highlight the dissonances (but also potential resonances) with a transitions
management approach :
First, policy has a strongly technological focus but this co-exists with an emerging
recognition of systemic issues. Energy issues were generally seen in policy circles in
terms of technologies – e.g. renewable, oil and coal, nuclear etc – with a concurrent strong
techno-economic interest rather than a transitions focus. Yet there was some evidence that
this is changing with an emerging focus on sustainable low carbon futures.
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Second the focus on the development of a framework for markets and the use of a linear
model of innovation. There was a strong emphasis, in policy documents and through
discussions with national officials, on ‘not picking winners’. This privileged a view of
technological neutrality (despite the focus on different sectors outlined above) and,
therefore, the role of policy was ambivalent, with a simultaneous emphasis on government
providing a framework for innovation in energy systems but then not picking particular
systems. The dominant discourse was that it was for the market to decide how energy
targets are achieved. Yet, at the same time transformation in energy systems was also
understood and characterised as a linear process: one of ‘pulling the technology through’
the process of ‘research’, ‘development’, ‘demonstrations’ and ‘deployment’.
Finally, a highly distributed governance context with outsourcing of strategy formulation
and relationship management to intermediaries. Responsibilities for hydrogen were
distributed across many different departments (e.g. DTI, DCLG, HMT and DfT) with very
little sense of different departmental activities being widely understood or shared in a
strategic sense across departments. Capacity to engage with developing a policy position
on the hydrogen economy – both in terms of human and financial capital - was limited and
the tendency was to outsource strategic work and coordination of this agenda to
consultancies or other agencies. Consequently, there was little sense of what a strategic
approach might represent.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have engaged with and added to the body of transitions literature. We
critically and sympathetically engaged with this literature in respect of four broad issues is
managing transitions:
1) Prospective views of the future through transitions;
2) The role of places in managing transitions in context;
3) The role of publics in transitions processes;
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4) And the resonances and dissonances between transitions approaches and the UK
policy context.
First, we reviewed the technological transitions approach focusing on the following issues:
i), can transitions be managed; ii), how transitions are conceptualised; iii) what are the key
transition phases; and iv) what are the key shortcomings of transitions approaches. We
focused on three particular issues raised by Berkhout et al, (2003). The first of these is to
question the view that regime change begins in niches and works upwards and thus
underplays the role of landscape pressures on regimes. Second, they are univalent in that
they underplay issues of power and overplay consensus, intention and choice in the face of
potentially multiple social actors and expectations. The final point, that they are
unidimensional, claims that transition approaches often underplay differences in transition
contexts and the balance between historical contingency and human agency (Berkhout et
al, 2003). With this in mind, Berkhout et al propose an emphasis on regime change which
acknowledges the multilineal, multivalent and multidimensional. In doing this they
highlight that addressing the context of the regime in transition processes opens up the
possibilities for understanding a variety of transition pathways. Moving from an over-
privileging of the niche as the predominant pressure on the regime to also thinking about
the role of other regimes and the landscape in exerting pressures (the combination of top-
down and bottom-up pressures) on incumbent regimes raises questions about how
incumbent regimes transformations can be understood. Adaptive capacity refers to the
collective capacity of the regime to recognise, respond to and influence regime
transformation. In addressing the relationship between contexts of regime transformation
and transformation processes, Berkhout and colleagues highlight the importance of two
sets of issues. The first being that pressures for change within a system originate both
within and outside a regime and the second is that the critical issue is to understand how
differing social interests adapt to such signals. Consequently: ‘there emerges a clear need
for greater acknowledgement and understanding of different transition contexts’ (Berkhout
et al, 2003, p.18, emphasis added). However, the transitions literature says little about the
‘where’ of different contexts; it offers a limited sense of place.
Second, we developed a perspective that views transitions as being embedded in particular
places and that places are differentially positioned in terms of their ability to inform
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transitions. The concept of systemic intermediaries was developed as it allows us to
address the extent to which cities and regions can strategically shape technological
transitions. In doing this, we suggested that understanding the early stages of transitions in
particular cities and regions mean we need to understand two sets of social processes.
First, outlining the vision that has been developed for a particular place-based transition.
Second to understand the negotiations of these visions in terms of the social actors
involved and the expectations from different positions embodied in them - this requires a
focus not only on ‘endogenous’ relationships within cities and regions but also on the
‘exogenous’ relationships with national government, private capital etc. The step between
1 and 2 allows us to look not only at the vision but also the extent of any ‘gap’ between
the vision and issues of capacity in relation to the extent to which cities and regions may
shape (and be shaped by) transitions.
Third, we have developed and demonstrated a framework for analysing the interplay
between ‘public engagement’, technological development and the local context of its
(non-) appropriation. This attempts to re-connect transition approaches to the role of
publics, the specificity of places and competing visions of socio-technical change. By
sensitising transitions approaches to these issues we have attempted to develop transition
perspectives in the following four ways. First, we have highlighted the critical role and
importance of symbolic and often highly partial visions of the future, in the present,
through the development of technological change. Second, we have demonstrated the
potential variability and particularity of those social interests whose expectations inform a
particular view of the future. Third, we have illustrated the potential consequences of these
differences in the ways in which particular social interests, and their domination of power
relationships, informs the negotiation and renegotiation of a vision of the future in its
translation to practice. Finally we highlighted that key lessons can be learnt from
processes of moving from Vision to Actuality.
Our review of place and publics demonstrates that the key issue, and focus for future
research, thus becomes developing a better understanding of the interplay of vision,
expectations, processes and methods in specific contexts. This call is not to be totally
reducible or to capitulate to context but to develop sensitivity to context. In doing this,
development of cases in particular contexts are not an end in themselves but should be
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used to inform comparison of patterns, trends and regularities. Through such a programme
of work the transitions approach could begin to, more carefully and systemically, become
sensitised and transformed to a wider politics of publics, place and expectations that
recognises and works within differential and asymmetries of power.
Finally, we reviewed the affinities between the UK national policy context for the
hydrogen economy and technological transitions approaches. We demonstrated that it is
important to understand the following three styles of thinking within which the
development of the hydrogen strategy was strongly shaped which highlight the
dissonances (but also potential resonances) with a transitions management approach. First,
policy has a strongly technological focus but this co-exists with an emerging recognition
of systemic issues. Energy issues were generally seen in policy circles in terms of
technologies – e.g. renewable, oil and coal, nuclear etc – with a concurrent strong techno-
economic interest rather than a transitions focus. Yet there was some evidence that this is
changing with an emerging concern with sustainable low carbon futures. Second the focus
on the development of a framework for markets and the use of a linear model of
innovation. There was a strong emphasis, in policy documents and through discussions
with national officials, on ‘not picking winners’. This privileged a view of technological
neutrality (despite the focus on different sectors outlined above) and, therefore, the role of
policy was ambivalent, with a simultaneous emphasis on government providing a
framework for innovation in energy systems but then not picking particular systems. The
dominant discourse was that it was for the market to decide how energy targets are
achieved. Yet, at the same time transformation in energy systems was also understood and
characterised as a linear process: one of ‘pulling the technology through’ the process of
‘research’, ‘development’, ‘demonstrations’ and ‘deployment’. Finally, a highly
distributed governance context with outsourcing of strategy formulation and relationship
management to intermediaries. Responsibilities for hydrogen were distributed across
many different departments (e.g. DTI, DCLG, HMT and DfT) with very little sense of
different departmental activities being widely understood or shared in a strategic sense
across departments. Capacity to engage with developing a policy position on the hydrogen
economy – both in terms of human and financial capital - was limited and the tendency
was to outsource strategic work and coordination of this agenda to consultancies or other
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agencies. Consequently, there was little sense of what a strategic approach might
represent.
Consequently, we have critically highlighted key sets of themes and issues to be
considered in both thinking critically about transitions which provide a basis for guiding
and informing those undertaking transitions as to the issues, potentials and difficulties in
undertaking transitions.
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